POLAC ECONOMIC REVIEW (PER)
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
NIGERIA POLICE ACADEMY, WUDIL-KANO

NEGATIVE IMPACT OF CORRUPTION IN NIGERIAN POLICE FORCE IN CURTAINING CRIMINALITY IN RURAL COMMUNITIES OF BORNO STATE, NIGERIA

Fatima Bukar Bababe, PhD Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Maiduguri

Abstract

This examines Negative Impact of Corruption in Nigerian Police in Curtaining Criminality in Rural Communities in Borno State, Nigeria. The objectives are to examine the role of Nigerian Police in Curtaining Criminalities, assess the Causes of Corruption in Nigerian Police in Rural Communities in, Borno State, examine the Effects of Corruption in Nigerian Police in Rural Communities in Borno State and identify the possible ways to Curb Corruption in Nigerian Police in Rural Communities in Borno State. However, literature were reviewed in line with objectives. The survey research design was used to get suitable information from the study area. The population for the study were Nigerian Police Force in Rural Communities in Borno State. Data were collected and analyzed using descriptive statistics of frequency count and percentage tables. The findings revealed that Police force interpret law and maintain order, protect lives and properties, apprehend and detain criminals as well as keep order in the public. The findings on the Causes of Corruption in Nigerian Police in Rural Communities in Borno State. Low wages and affiliation with criminal networks engage police officers can exacerbate bribery and extortion, if a police force fails to promote adequate pay, career development, and professionalism, then systemic corruption can occur, police officers are not punished for corruption, corrupt activity increases and becomes embedded within a police force as well as lack of institutional accountability. The study recommended that Federal government should provide logistics to the police performance in criminal justice system in order to encourage accountability in discharging their duties.

Keywords: Corruption, Police, Curtaining and Criminality

Introduction

Indeed, police corruption is a universal problem. However, it is a particular challenge in Nigeria with an ever increasing misconduct that impacts on the development of police institution in the country. Corruption, generally defined as abuse of authority for private gain, is among the world's oldest practices (Spector, 2011). It has been identified as the biggest challenge that confronts governance machinery of Nigeria. Nigeria, as a nation, is ranked 139th out of 176 countries in Transparency International's 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index, tied with Azerbaijan, Kenya, Nepal, and Pakistan. Corruption in the administration of law means that equal access is denied. It undermines fair trials, fair elections, economic and social opportunities, cultural expression, and access to the necessities of food, housing, health, education, and water (International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2009).

The Nigeria Police is one of the most fundamental government bodies endowed with the rights and responsibilities of protecting the people and maintaining peace and order. The rights and responsibilities of the police are the duties aligned with the state's primary responsibilities of guaranteeing peace, safety, and security of the people in the society. Reiner (1993) states that police are special carriers of state's bedrock power, and are the agents with authority for legitimate use of force for maintaining public and private goods and services. In this regard, the police defend the character of the state as a capable political organization, protecting and preserving the interests of the entire society. When police abandon their legitimate functions, the society is vulnerable to insecurity, crimes, brutality etc. In the face of ever increasing acts of lawlessness, social disorder, armed robbery, political assassinations, village rivalry and hatred, police involvement in the collection of bribes and private gifts is inimical to peace and security of the society. This situation portrays the police in bad light.

Corruption in the Police Force involves exploitation of their public position, resources, and power to suppress individuals in order to bargain for bribes (Obayelu 2007). Ogundiya (200) states that "police corruption is a betrayal of public trust". This behavior involves the misuse of public power, a deviation from acceptable norms, and unauthorized use of public resources for private gain. The problem is that, when the police are involved in this type of criminal behavior [i.e. corruption], it undermines and constitutes obstacles to effective policing. The inevitable aftermath is that, a criminal cannot police another criminal, otherwise, the system becomes weakened, the society becomes vulnerable to various vices and criminal culture becomes liberalized. This situation provoked the erstwhile Inspector General of Police, Mohammed Abubakar to remove "road-blocks from the nation's highways" (Uma & Eboh 2013). Dishonest behavior in professional engagement depicts policing to fraud, bribery, abuse of office, robbery and other immoral practices. Therefore, the Nigeria Police image problem cannot just vanish by some exorcisms, but could be remedied through careful police trainings and management.

Nigeria Police was established by law. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, Chapter VI, Part III Supplemental B, Sections 214-216, established contemporary Nigeria Police Force. Meanwhile, the 1979 and 1989 Federal Constitutions, in conjunction with that of 1999, have several provisions for police duties and responsibilities of protecting the citizens, maintaining peace and order, enforcing traffic laws and promoting police-community relations. The police duties also include: prevention and detection of crime, apprehension of offenders, preservation of law and order, protection of life and property, and enforcement of all laws and regulation.

Statement of the Problem It is a common sight in the country for police officers to be seen collecting money from private and commercial motorists at checkpoints mounted across the country. However, beyond the checkpoints, officers of the police are in the habit of displaying their corrupt tendencies in criminal investigations and other sundry duties (Ladapo, 2013). So many crimes go un-investigated by the police where influential persons, including persons in government are fingered as suspects or where the suspects "sort the police investigators", a slang for bribe payment (Ladapo, 2013). According to a recent Human Rights Watch report (2012), officers of the Nigerian Police often commit crimes against the very citizens that they are mandated to protect

.

On several occasions, Nigerians that are only making efforts to make ends meet are accosted on a daily basis by armed police officers who demands bribes, threatening those that refuse with arrest or physical harm. On a good number of occasions, the level of police brutality has been exposed through the killing and maiming of those that refuses to 'settle' police officers when they make such demands. Meanwhile, high-level police officers embezzle public funds meant to pay for police operations. The Human Rights Watch report (2012) concludes that in Nigeria, the police have become "a symbol of unfettered corruption, mismanagement, and abuse." there is often a widespread existence of a Blue Code of Silence among the police wherever corruption exists (Alemika, 1988; Ahire, 1991). This is in order to prevent the corruption from coming to light. Officers in these situations commonly fail to report corrupt behaviour or provide false testimony to external investigators to cover up criminal activity by their fellow officers. However, the level of corruption among the Nigerian police is such that hiding the trend and extent is practically impossible. This is consequent upon the openness in the display of corrupt practices by police officers who demand rather than solicit for bribes on the roads and other public places.

Empirical studies have posited that police corruption wastes resources, undermines security, makes a mockery of justice, slows economic development, and alienates populations from their governments (Ibrahim, 2003, Wang, 2013). Based on the fact that the police are the primary institutions for implementing laws in any society, corrupt practices by the police inhibits the implementation of the rule of law in place. It is common knowledge that the rule of law ceases to exist when police sell their services for private profit (Okeshola, 2008). This therefore underscores the relevance of studies directed at this subject as eliminating police corruption is required for any country that has establishing the rule of law as a national objective.

The general objective of the study is to assess negative impact of corruption in Nigerian Police in curtaining criminality in rural criminalities of Borno State, Nigeria. The specific objectives are to:

Assess the role of Nigerian Police in curtaining criminalities in rural criminalities of Borno State,
Identify the causes of corruption in Nigerian Police in rural criminalities of Borno State,
Examine the effects of corruption in Nigerian Police on rural criminalities of Borno State,
Identify the possible ways to curb corruption in Nigerian Police in criminalities in rural criminalities of Borno State.

Scope of the Study The research is limited accordingly to the assessment of the role of Nigerian police in curtaining criminality, causes, effect and possible ways to curb corruption in Nigerian police Force in rural criminalities of Borno State. To arrive at this point, the researcher will cover the activities of Nigerian Police Force in Maiduguri and it effect in ongoing crime from 2017 -2022. The choice of this period is as a result of the increases in insecurity, loss of lives and property in rural criminalities of Borno State.

Significance of the Study A lot of lives have been lost due to disastrous crimes around the state over the years more peoples engage themselves in committing crimes in order to achieve their personal goals. The result of the study will help to understand various issues and increase public awareness on Nigerian Police Force.

The result of the study is significant in providing developmental strategies on prevention and control of corruption in contemporary Nigeria Police Force in curtaining in rural criminalities of as well expose the area's where the Nigerian Police Force need enhancement for management of crime. The study provides information to researchers for further study in the similar topics under study.

Concept of the Corruption in Nigerian Police Force

To understand police corruption, a background of what can loosely be defined as corruption is needed. The word 'corruption' originates from the Latin term 'corrupts,' meaning to disrupt, break, spoil, or contaminate (Nicholls et al. 2006). In very narrow terms, corruption constitutes the misuse of power for private gain (Kurer 2015). If starting from this slender definition, there are multiple practices that meet the requirements of corruption. Corruption is often thought of as bribery, covering the abuse of power and authority of position for individual advantage, but the benefit does not have to be financial (von Alemann 1989).

The Police is defined as an official body of men and women charged with the duty to protect people and their property and to make everybody obey the law of the land as well as checkmating of criminal acts. Similarly, section 214 (2) (b) of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) made a provision that the members of the Nigeria Police Force shall have such powers and duties as may be conferred upon them by the law.

As well as police deviance, misconduct and corruption may have different conceptions but can be overlapping. Ivković (2005) identifies that police misconduct concerns the execution or omission of an act performed by a police officer or whole department that violates legal rules (such as criminal and federal codes or internal rules). For instance, a wrongful act performed by a police officer or department includes planting evidence and taking a bribe in exchange for a motorist avoiding a speeding ticket for skipping a red light is an omission (Ivković 2014). Hence, police corruption, deviance, and misconduct cover illicit activities, inappropriate practices, or the contravention of internal rules during working hours and official duties. These misbehaviours meet the requirements of police malfeasance.

There are broader concepts of police corruption that can be brought to attention. This can include smaller abuses of police authority for minimal gain. This is illustrated by McMullan's (1961) earlier work on corruption, stretching to minor privileges, minor kickbacks, gratuities, and performing working duties in expectation of an additional treat. Rather than linearly thinking of police corruption constituting bribery, personal advantage, and minor perks, a police officer can also abuse their position with the intent of departmental, rather than solely individual, gain (Kleinig 1996). Advancing departmental advantage may be justified as noble cause corruption that can include a police officer falsifying evidence or using excessive force to attain an arrest (Pyman et al. 2012).

In terms of the main practices of police corruption, there are several typologies that identify nine activities (that also overlap with police deviance and misconduct):

i. **Corruption of authority:** attaining perks without contravening the law, such as receiving free meals, beverages, and services.
ii. **Kickbacks:** money, services, or goods obtained for business referrals promoting a company or individual.
iii. **Opportunistic theft:** stealing from people who have been arrested, engaged in accidents, or from victims or deceased persons.
iv. **Turning a blind eye:** bribes undertaken for omitting a felony, arrest, or seizure of property.
v. **Protection of illegal activities:** protecting criminal groups or individuals engaged in illegal practices, such as protection rackets (drugs, gambling, and prostitution rings) in vice areas.
vi. **Fixing:** undermining criminal investigation or deliberately losing traffic or speeding tickets.
vii. **Direct criminal activities:** engaging in a crime against an individual or property to attain individual advantage.
viii. **Internal payoffs:** when promotions, annual leave, and shift allocations are bought, traded, and vended.
ix. **Adding or planting of evidence:** when evidence is planted to frame an individual or group, which is usually within drug cases (Roebuck and Barker 1974; Punch 1985; Carter 1990; Sayed and Bruce 1998; Barker 2006).

These nine practices of police corruption serve as a typology and are hierarchical, with one being the least serious form of police corruption and nine being the most. There has been a debate regarding the severity of police corruption that intensifies over time during a police officer's career (Kleinig 1996). Sherman (1985) has adopted the slippery slope analogy to argue that police officers may begin accepting minor gratuities, such as free coffee or discounted meals, near the outset of their career and gradually engage in more serious forms of police corruption. In other words, new recruits internalise values from their experienced partner or trainer and adopt the similar habits that intensify with time.

The work of Newburn (1999) suggests that analysing the motives and potential outcomes of police behaviour may be reinforced and even fortified as acceptable behaviour within a police department. A variety of studies on police misconduct have found that profit-driven crime is the main practice of police malfeasance. In a study conducted with the New York City Police Department (NYPD), Kane and White (2013) found that bribe-taking constituted the highest profit-motivated cases of 387 NYPD officer's 'career-ending police misconduct.' In a US nationwide study, Stinson et al. (2018) focus on 'profit-motivated police crime' concerning 1, 396 police officers misusing their authority when perpetrating crime for personal advantage. Most perpetrators of police-related profit-driven crime were patrol officers 'while on-duty' that also included drug-, violence-, sex-, and alcohol-related crimes (Stinson et al. 2018). In a six-fold survey and nine focus groups on policing in Russia by Gerber and Mendelson (2008), policing was predatory where officers abused their authority to pursue personal material interests rather than preserve internal security or protect elitist interests that undermined public trust in policing and the courts. This finding of reducing public confidence in law enforcement and the judiciary is similar to the United States when police corruption is unravelled. Yet, in the Russian context, predatory policing also hinders democratic reform.

Although police corruption is largely associated with individual advantage, and even departmental when considering noble cause corruption and perjury, Bayley and Perito (2011) expand to include the violation of rules without financial advantage, such as abusing prisoners, racism, and sexual misconduct. Huberts (1998) has presented integrity violations that include police corruption, theft and fraud, uncertain promises and gifts, moonlighting (working in non-declared secondary jobs), misusing information, intimidating citizens and colleagues, the misuse of power for the justified good (noble cause corruption), abusing and wasting resources, and violating the law outside of working hours and duty. Although these listed integrity violations intertwine police corruption, deviance, misconduct, and ethics, they are harmful to any police force (Singh 2020).

Causes of Nigerian Police Corruption

The underlying reasons behind police corruption are multifaceted. There are notable constant and variable factors. In relation to the constant factors, discretion can be exercised with licit and illicit cores; managerial absence of visibility; secrecy of managers preserving police culture even if corruption prone; low salary and status issues; and affiliation with criminals that hinders the performance of police duties (Newburn 1999). Low wages can exacerbate bribery and extortion, especially when living costs are high for large families (Van Reenen 1997). Even if police officers are well salaried, they may believe that they are not renumerated to match their responsibilities and thus can still encourage corrupt practices (Newburn 1999). From a Durkheimian perspective, relative deprivation theory forms anomie, and when individuals cannot attain what they believe to be part of distributive fairness, then social deviance, such as corruption, can emerge (Kulik et al. 2008). Police officers can become prey to lucrative ventures of criminal groups to turn a blind eye so that they can continue their illegal businesses (Punch 1994). In hostile settings, organised criminal networks permeate police units to act within their narrow, and profit-making, interests by averting detection, investigative processes, and sanctions (Manning and Redlinger 1979; Buscaglia and González-Ruíz 2006). Criminal groups pay off police officers that corrupt law enforcement in high drug cultivating, dealing, and trafficking areas (Maas 1997). Police officers may be engaged in a drug trade for profitable gain and personal use (Newburn 1999,).

In relation to variable features that encourage corruption, legal openings to participate in corrupt activities when there are no victims can result in the exploitation of minor traffic, construction, and licensing offences (Newburn 1999). When considering organisational structures, if a police force fails to promote adequate pay, career development, and professionalism, then systemic corruption can occur (Wood 1997). A community may also tolerate minor practices of corruption and thus a police department may encourage petty corruption as legitimate (Sherman 1978). The protection of a police department or the Interior Ministry from corruption investigations can taint efforts to control and curtail police corruption (Mollen 1994).

In relation to the constant and variable factors, a central cause of police corruption is weak accountability. When police officers are not punished for corruption, corrupt activity increases and becomes embedded within a police force. Prenzler (2009) has similarly identified that good policing is seriously undermined by 'safety from punishment provided by' supervisors and authorities 'to errant police' officers 'and the lack of accountability.' Anassi (2004) noted that 'police corruption always reflects a lack of institutional accountability.' For instance, in Kenya, police officers saw 'themselves as the law' (Anassi 2004). In Latin America, accountability for police corruption is severely hindered by 'institutional structures lacking resources' (Banks 2009). In Costa Rica, holding police officers accountable is deemed as undermining police work (Banks 2009). Therefore, weak accountability has been demonstrated in developing and hostile states. However, debilitated accountability for police corruption is also discernible in modern democracies.

Based on the constant and variable factors of police corruption, low wages and affiliation with criminal networks engage police officers in illicit and lucrative ventures, including the drug and prostitution trades that infiltrate police practices and law enforcement to act within private narrow interests. This form of state capture seriously undermines the rule of law and security. The rule of law promotes the equality of everyone before law by ensuring that no one, including rulers or other private individuals, is above the law that functions with accountability, transparency of an open government, just laws, and accessible and fair justice (Hobson 1996). State capture can be identified when a police force, an ethnic majority group, or a political party intercepts institutional functionality to act in the interests of criminal networks by advancing and protecting their (usually illicit) profit-making agenda (Karklins 2005). At the same time, petty corruption can become a cultural form of acceptable everyday practice and thus systemic corruption (in which state capture operates) and petty corruption are interconnected.

When police officers are lowly renumerated and greedy political elites coordinate with a drug mafia, parts of the state are seized to undermine policing functions and protect the profit made by the drug trade. In Mexico and Albania, police administrators and chiefs profit handsomely with predatory tactics on low-ranked police officers to participate in bribery and avoid pursuing drug offenders (United States Committee on Government Reform 2000, Horvitz and Catherwood 2006). Corruption can be constant when pay is low and there are vice areas and private illicit interests at stake and it can be variable when minor gratuities, and petty bribes, are deemed legitimate by a police department and corruption probes are cascaded. A range of studies from the 1990s do indicate that raising wages helps to combat petty corruption. By way of illustration, Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) hypothesise that low wages result in civil servants supplementing wages by corrupt or illicit means, while high wages equate to higher losses if the civil servant is caught and namely dismissed. Yet, the study finds ‘a close negative association between relative civil service wages and corruption across the’ 28 ‘developing countries in’ the ‘data-set’ and ‘relative wages are closely related to measures of the quality of the bureaucracy and of the rule of law’ (Van Rijckeghem and Weder 1997). The results indicate that increasing wages does not always help curb petty corruption alone. This is particularly evident in countries facing high inflation and where opportunities to engage in corrupt activity exist.

However, an example of successful elimination in petty corruption is evident in Georgia during Mikheil Saakashvili’s administration (2003–2007 reform) which increased the police salary by 15 times and also introduced a merit-based recruitment system (World Bank 2012). The World Bank (2012) found that experienced staff and loyal officials ‘were retained to run divisions’, and young energetic staff were appointed that increased the average wages of public officials, for instance, in construction licensing, ‘by a factor of 20’ to further undermine incentives of soliciting or accepting bribes.

Effects of Police Corruption

The principal causes and practices of police corruption in hostile societies seriously undermines the rule of law, security, and state effectiveness. This section addresses the main repercussions of police corruption in unstable settings. Corruption hinders the state and threatens the rule of law that can result in the channelling of state resources from public use to private groups that distorts the duties of police officers to act in these interests (Voorhoeve 2007). For example, in Pakistan, the rule of law is eroded from weak accountability mechanisms of corrupt practices (Mahmood 2007). ‘Police corruption and extrajudicial killings’ remain as problems in Pakistan, and the police are politically influenced, which includes the appointments and transferring of ‘officers for political gain’ (Waseem 2022). Pakistani civilians in Lahore, Punjab, frequently fear the police force, are prone to police bribery and blackmail, and crime and corruption remain high (Jackson et al. 2014). In neighbouring India, motorists regularly pay bribes to police officers at checkpoints to avert delays and further harassment as a form of everyday business interactions (Bayley and Perito 2011). Indian truckers pay an estimated USD 4.5 billion per annum in bribes and the police claim 45 per cent of these bribes with forced stoppages on roads amounting to 11 hours per day (Robinson 2017).

In drug-fuelled states, corruption permeates governmental and law enforcement functions that place citizens at an increased risk of poverty (Leiken 1996). For instance, in Zambia, the drug industry entices government officials to pocket money in exchange for omitting drug-related offences (Ihonvbere 2003). McIntyre (2008) stresses that Zambian traffic police engage in daily bribery. The Zambian public deem their police officers as highly corrupt due to the demand of the largest amounts of bribes within all institutions; corruption commences in 80 per cent of all interactions with the police; and officers are poorly trained and receive low wages (Eke 2018). Police corruption impacts on poorer Zambian households who are forced to pay a higher slice of their household incomes (Shamapande 2007). Extortion at roadblocks is commonplace practice when interacting with Zambian police officers (Eke 2018). Due to prevalent police corruption, the Zambian police force is publicly perceived as one of the most corrupt institutions in the country (Kajoba 2021). Once national institutions have been captured by criminal entities, and often their black-market enterprises, domestic criminal justice actors, and their processes, cannot uphold accountability.

In another narco-state, but also engaged in armed conflict for three decades, Afghanistan was within Transparency International's Global Corruption Index as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. After the Taliban were ousted from power in late 2001, international state builders, and namely the Bonn Agreement, placed Hamid Karzai as the Chair of the Afghan Transitional Administration (Eichenwald 2012, McDonald 2016). Karzai and his political cronies engaged in prevalent forms of systemic and drug-related corruption, due to state capture from insurgent and criminal groups and former warlords within the presidential cabinet who were pardoned from a parliamentary 2007 Amnesty Blanket Immunity Law (Human Rights Watch 2010). During both presidential tenures of Karzai, endemic corruption within the Afghan police force, government, and judiciary resulted in the 2006 and 2010 Taliban codes of conduct (Lahya) to fight the corrupt and irreligious police force and seek public support with alternative modes of security and dispute resolution processes (Singh 2014). Hence, pervasive police corruption resulted in further Taliban remobilisation as a response to combat state corruption.

In a nationwide survey conducted by Integrity Watch Afghanistan (2010) across all 34 Afghan provinces, half of the respondents believed that corruption, principally corruption within the Interior Ministry and Afghan National Police (ANP), fuelled support for the Taliban and the insurgency were fighting the corrupt administration. In another countrywide survey conducted by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), a quarter of the sampled Afghan respondents stressed that they paid at least one bribe averaging USD 100–200 to the ANP and local officials in 2009 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2010). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) also found that many ANP officers: abused their position, used weapons and equipment when off-duty, were engaged in the drug trade, extorted bribes from vehicles and farmers, and demanded recurrent protection fees from shop vendors (United Nations Development Programme 2009). At the senior level, the Ministry of Interior Affairs sold police chief positions at up to USD 200,000 and fetched further money if within a high drug cultivating province (Isaqzadeh & Giustozzi 2015, Singh 2020). Therefore, corruption was prevalent in the majority of the Afghan ministries and principally the Interior Ministry (Achakzai 2010). Despite corruption being perceived as a dirty act, the payment of bribes is often considered as a social norm by the public, where nepotism and gift giving and paying bribes to civil servants are not deemed offensive because the act benefits the giver (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2010). Azami (2009) has similarly contended that corruption was functional and accepted in Afghanistan to get things done by speeding up transactions with officials.

As a consequence of daily frustrations with police corruption, young angry men supported and joined the Taliban (Shelley 2014). The Taliban utilised its agenda fighting police corruption for its shadow governance to seek further support. This demonstrates that police corruption can entice public support for an insurgency to eventually topple a government, as evident in August 2021. A report by Bolle and Røst (2021) identifies that despite more than USD 100 billion spent on the Afghan police force, endemic police corruption within the senior and lower ranks attributed to undermine police and state legitimacy. The civil war resulted in economic collapse due to the formation of a 'shadow state' for greedy political elites managing patronage networks to regulate an illicit and informal economy for pervasive corruption to benefit themselves (Reno 1995). As Newcombe (2011) argues, it can be inferred that dire socioeconomic scenarios, political corruption, and police corruption breeds conflict and support for armed anti-opposition groups. Taking these cases into consideration, it can be contended that insecurity and the breakdown of the rule of law is more severe in less developed, and particularly volatile, settings than in stable democratic countries. This further impacts on the quality of policing and unstable environment(s) that in turn intensifies police corruption and protracts conflict.

Prevention Strategies to Curb Nigerian Police Corruption

This study has so far considered the problems that police corruption brings within hostile societies, which also protracts conflict and undermines the legitimacy of law enforcement and the host government. The purpose of this section is to introduce a variety of efforts that can attempt to fight police corruption in volatile settings.

A study conducted by Transparency International on 10 country case studies found that the risks for corruption involving the police display notable similarities across jurisdictions and countries (Pyman et al. 2012). Several recommendations propose structural changes, increasing salaries, forming a vetted recruitment process, incorporating ethics and integrity in training, internal and external monitoring, creating an investigative anticorruption unit, changing organisational culture, promoting civil society involvement and oversight, and wider reforms (Pyman et al. 2012).

Despite these useful large-scale recommendations, Bayley and Perito (2011) are pessimistic about curbing police corruption in conflict-stricken states because they comprise insecurity, untrustworthy staff, and flawed institutions, and police corruption is fostered by social attitudes and cultural structures encapsulated in local life. Indeed, insecurity, the breakdown of the rule of law, predatory neopatrimonial politics, and social practices encouraging corruption as part of business relations and the social fabric are further obstacles when attempting to fight police corruption in volatile environments.

At this stage of describing reforms and recommendations to reduce police corruption, petty corruption and grand/political corruption can be distinguished as each produces different incentives, objectives, consequences, and politics. Administrative corruption is the misuse of power, roles, or resources of non-elected officials within public bureaucracies and is often exercised by bribery, extortion, kickbacks, or favouritism (Philp 2008, Rose-Ackerman 2008). The incentives of administrative corruption rest on extra or supplementary income with the objective of performing a public duty or service that should be free of cost (United States Agency for International Development 2009). The consequences include poorer people paying a higher slice of their household incomes that in turn protracts poverty (Askari et al. 2010, World Bank 2021).

Grand/political corruption involves the entirety of a 'bureaucratic hierarchy, electoral system, or governmental structure from top to bottom' that is entrenched with corruption in which state resources are tapped by senior, and ruling, political elites (Rose-Ackerman 2008). The objectives are for political elites and police chiefs to encourage and manage bribery to the lower levels to organise corrupt systems by collaborating with organised criminal groups, public utilities, lotteries, and tax collectors and contracting with private firms

(Rose-Ackerman 2008). The consequences rest on further corrupt and weak judiciaries that have frail established rules in namely war-torn countries that are prevalent with private firms encouraging rent-seeking behaviour, kickbacks, and the bribery of public officials for contracts (Vargas-Hernández 2010). Taking these incentives, objectives, and consequences into consideration, even though grand/political corruption very much exists in strong Western democratic states, it is more severe in conflict states that have a weak rule of law. The political instability, weakness in fragile states, is different compared to very similar behaviours occurring in some non-conflict and developed states insofar that the political, economic, and social structures differ.

Now that a variety of international strategies on curbing police corruption and the impacts of both administrative and grand/political corruption have been provided, the remainder of this section covers several aspects of the mentioned policy reforms. This includes commissions of inquiry, meritocratic appointments and pay reform (as part of public administration and civil service reforms), anticorruption commissions, rotating police officers on a periodical basis, and strengthening accountability.

Although commissions of inquiry result in further negative public perceptions of a police department by exposing police corruption, they are important to disclose police corruption, and the verdicts provided help to identify the main causes, practices, and typologies of misconduct (Pyman et al. 2012). For instance, the famous Knapp (1972) revealed police corruption within the New York Police Department and made recommendations for commanders to face accountability for the actions of their subordinates and file periodic reports on important characteristics that would promote corruption. Blaming a few bad apples who undermine the reputation of a police department does not deal with corruption at the institutional level (Knapp 1972). As a result, the Commission also provided a typology on grass-eating and meat-eating corruption and stressed that commanders using the few bad apples excuse was unjustifiable as a rotten orchard, systemic corruption, was extensive (Knapp 1972). Grass-eating corruption describes police officers who receive perks, solicit small payments from gamblers and contractors that is learned from other officers each day and is promoted for proving loyalty to a precinct. Meat-eating corruption designates more aggressive opportunities that can be exploited for financial advantage, which includes shakedowns of pimps and drug dealers, and is justified to punish perilous criminals of society (Knapp 1972). When analysing 32 commissions of inquiry, Bayley and Perito (2011) found that police commanders regularly argued that a few bad apples attributed to prevalent corruption instead of acknowledging the corrupt behaviour and actions they permitted. Acknowledging systemic failure and the role of police commanders rather than blaming a few bad apples can promote a change in leadership attitudes and work on recovering broken relationships with the populace.

There are a range of other anticorruption strategies that have been financed heavily by both the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World Bank. USAID focuses on fighting corruption for better development and promoting states to ratify the United Nations Convention against Corruption and better defining corruption to also include lower officials engaging in the demand of smaller bribes (Lho and Cabuay 2005, Miller 2007, Seidler 2008). The World Bank has also focused on Public Administration Reform and Civil Service Reform by enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of the public sector to avoid the overlapping of duties, installing fair and openly competitive meritocratic procedures, and promoting the oversight of watchdog groups, such as civil society organisations (CSOs) and non-governmental organisations (World Bank 2000, Mussari and Cepiku 2007). Meritocracy is a strategy to recruit and promote governmental workers based on skills and competencies that can be aligned with pay reform to reduce patronage, nepotism, and corruption (Kaufmann and Dininio 2006). Raising awareness and promoting education of corruption is pivotal for transition or post-war states that can be promoted by CSOs and the dissemination of civil society reports (World Bank 2000, 2006). The World Bank (2021) has prohibited over 1000 firms and people, and in 2020, '49 firms and individuals' were punished to encourage better 'internal compliance' programmes as part of their penalty. Similarly, United States Agency for International Development (2021) has reported success 'working with journalists and' supporting 'civil society advocacy' together with multilateral cooperation.

Alongside merit-based recruitment, pay and grading structures have been placed within public administration reform (Lister 2006). As part of the public administration reform, pay reform has been prescribed as part of an anticorruption strategy to avoid hindering the efficiency of the public sector and civil service. Police forces have also adopted pay reform to avert petty forms of corruption by increasing accountability measures, meaning that the sanctions outweigh the benefits of engaging in corrupt activity to avert 'low-risk, high-reward activity' (Quah 2011). Imposing a strict penalty system can fight police corruption to promote better police behaviour. As Sherman (1978) argues, dismissals of police officers deter police corruption insofar that other officers will face similar punishment if engaged in corrupt or criminal activity. Rose-Ackerman (1999) refers to reducing the incentives of state employees participating in corruption activity as a 'survival strategy' when faced with poverty due to low wages. Pilapitiya (2004) similarly contends that corruption can be driven by 'need' when severely underpaid low-level officials take bribes as payments for basic economic necessities, such as school fees or food for their children.

By way of illustration, in Malaysia, meritocracy replaced patronage-based recruitment by installing open competitive examinations, oversight, disciplinary measures for malpractice, performance reviews, and raising ethical standards with pay levels in parallel with the private sector (Newfarmer and Nunberg 2000). This public administration reform initiative reduced brain drain in the public sector, but low wages in the Malaysian police force resulted in corruption, and thus the then former Inspector General, Tun Hanif Omar, proposed a 10–20 per cent wage increase (Peletz 2002). Leiken (1997) has argued that the provision of higher salaries to a police force that is notoriously corrupt can deter corrupt activities because better pay purchases insulation against bribery and patronage.

Prior to the recent Taliban takeover, in Afghanistan, the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service implemented a meritocratic appointment structure with grade 1 civil servants' salaries raised from USD 39.50 to USD 55.64 and grade 10 from USD 37.63 to USD 42.60 monthly (World Bank 2005). Pay reform then entered the Afghan armed and police forces, respectively. However, low pay within the ANP remained an issue that could not align with rising living costs, which resulted in bribery and roadside extortion to cater for large families (Singh 2020). Therefore, meritocratic recruitment and pay reform have the potential to reduce both patronage-based appointments and petty corruption within police forces, but salaries must be reformed in line with rising living costs. Even after pay reform, low pay was indeed a precursor of petty corruption, but internal controls, penalties, and sanctions for police corruption including the misuse and theft of police equipment—remained weak in the Afghan police force (Wilder 2007).

Independent anticorruption commissions are other initiatives that can promote greater transparency, the opportunity for anonymous whistleblowing, and accountability. These have had success stories in Singapore and Hong Kong (Singh 2021). Yet, in hostile settings that contain the influence of cartels and other criminal networks engaged in a drugs trade, independent anticorruption agencies can be undermined by bribery, threats and intimidation, and state capture. In Colombia, although the Álvaro Uribe Vélez administration tried to curtail corruption under the Presidential Programme of Modernisation, Efficiency, Transparency and Fight against Corruption that was replaced a few times, drug cartels have imposed bribes and intimidated judges and police officers at municipal levels (Kelly et al. 2008, Transparency for Colombia 2009). Similarly, Mexico struggled to establish an independent anticorruption agency until its Coordination Committee, but it remains permeated with rival drug cartels to maintain major drug trafficking organisations and immunity from prosecution (Beittel 2011). Efforts to campaign against drug trafficking organisations has been met with violence, and from December 2006 to July 2010, over 28,000 people died at the hands of drug trafficking violence (Beittel 2011). State capture remains an issue in volatile environments. Powerful criminal networks remain protected by political elites that hinder the roles of anticorruption agencies, and the primary national institutions of the criminal justice system cannot uphold accountability. Moreover, police forces are undermined by engaging in drug-related corruption or turning a blind eye due to fear and intimidation.

To deal with the smuggling of drugs, national agencies to fight drug-related corruption and crime have been established. In Nigeria, the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency has engaged with American-led ‘training in intelligence analysis,’ drug-related investigations, and prosecutions, but ‘poorly patrolled borders’ result in traffickers still transporting narcotics with air cargo and express mail services in large shipments ‘in and out of the country’ (Ettang & Leeke 2019). Therefore, even with an anticorruption and allied drug interdiction policy that includes the role of independent agencies, state capture, bribery, and the lack of a workforce remain impediments to fighting corruption within hostile states. The predominant facets of curbing corruption in hostile states are to promote public administration reform, civil service reform, and pay reform to interchangeably reduce staff size, avert overlapping duties, and screen and appoint the best candidates with meritocracy. This can raise the efficiency of public employees and the police force with adequate salaries to prevent petty corruption as a means of economic necessity.

Another initiative to combat corruption more specifically within the police force is rotation strategy. When police officers work for sustained periods within a territory, they can develop corrupt opportunities with organised criminals or establish corrupt webs (Prenzler 2002). The periodical rotation of police officers in vice areas or drug squads from one unit to another can undermine closely knit relationships and corrupt associations (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2017). Preventing clientelistic relationships and ties with close friends can challenge corrupt and bribery networks (Singh 2020). This worked well in Singapore for police officers in vulnerable posts, such as gambling clampdown officers, investigators, and ‘field intelligence officers,’ stationed in different locations or units every three years to decrease corrupt opportunities (Quah 2006). Germany and Russia have recommended the same strategy to reduce corruption within their police forces (Holmes 2022). However, a random assignment to combat corrupt and patronage networks can be counterproductive. In Afghanistan, rotated police officers found it hard to cater for living costs within their stationed distant provinces due to fewer breadwinners per household, resulting in bribery and roadside extortion for economic survival (Singh 2014). It can be inferred that a linear anticorruption strategy, such as pay reform and/or raising salaries, cannot successfully curb police corruption alone.

There have been recent strategies suggested and put in place to strengthen accountability in fighting corruption in rural communities of Borno. As identified in this article so far, when national institutions of the criminal justice system are seized by criminal groups and their enterprises, the accountability of law enforcement actors, political elites, and (protected) criminal groups is eroded. In these situations, independent investigations are needed from self-regulating international institutions to refer cases to courts. Under this strategy, the judges and prosecutors are independently vetted. Yeh (2021) has provided a specific model to create international inspectors comprising a body of United Nations inspectors and dedicated courts to fight corruption by investigating and prosecuting a range of financial crimes and allegations of corruption with the authority to transfer cases to national anticorruption courts. An example of an independent court is Ukraine’s High Anti-Corruption Court. It was established on 26 June 2018 by the controversially corrupt president, and oligarch, Petro Poroshenko (Yeh 2022). An assembly of non-Ukrainian global experts vetted the appointments of judges for the High Anti-Corruption Court to protect it from criminal and political manipulation (Zabokrytskyy 2020). The strategy of independent inspectors and dedicated national anticorruption courts can challenge state capture. Wages are paid by the international institution rather than national governments, because the latter can be manipulated by criminal groups. This model would make it harder to bribe prosecutors and judges of the national courts vetted by international experts.

USAID and Transparency International have provided studies on police corruption that compare relatively stable countries with conflict-stricken countries undergoing transitions to peace. In a study conducted by USAID, there are a variety of anticorruption mechanisms to minimise police corruption that include conflict-stricken countries (Neild 2007). In particular, the mechanisms include rules and standards with a code of ethics, enhancing transparency by publishing police statistics and protecting whistle-blowers, internal accountability with a disciplinary system, regular auditing, and personal financial asset declarations (Neild 2007). Moreover, external oversight with a prosecution and court system and roles of parliamentary and civilian oversight and improving pay and service conditions by providing a living wage, implementing a probationary stage, and merit-based standards for all career posts are part of the anticorruption strategy (Neild 2007). The USAID report provides detail on conflict-stricken countries. It infers that police corruption further erodes public trust and criminal investigation and detection; channels resources unfairly; maintains organised crime and protracts poor conditions for vulnerable people, such as refugees and human trafficking; and links support for terrorists (Neild 2007). Police corruption in conflict-stricken settings are unlikely to build 'public safety conditions' to sustain 'peace without addressing police corruption' (Neild 2007).

Data Presentation Analysis

Presented data collected using tables, frequency and percentage. This chapter also discussed the major findings of this study. The data analysis was done based on data obtained from the questionnaire administered to available respondents. For the purpose of this, 380 questionnaires were administered to the sampled respondents from the population under study. Out of the 380 distributed, 333 questionnaires were properly filled and retained and were used for the data analysis.

Data Presentation Analysis and Result

Table 1: Demographic Information of the Respondents n=333

S/No.	Statement		Responses	Percentage
1.	Age			
		15 –20 Years	32	9.51
		21 - 25 Years	68	20.42
		26 - 30 Years	96	28.83
		31 - 35 Years	62	18.62
		36 - 40 Years	39	11.71
		40 - 49 Years	36	9.61
2.	Mari Sex			
		Female	189	56.76
		Male	144	43.24
3.	Marital Status	Single	102	30.63
		Married	231	69.37
		Divorced	0	0
4.	Occupation			
		Security Personnel	56	16.82
		Civil Servant	72	21.62
		Student	71	21.32
		Business owner	109	32.73
		Farmer	25	7.51

Source: Field Survey, 2025

Table 1 shows demographic information of the respondents. The result above shows that 32(9.51%) were within 12 and 20 years, 68(20.42%) were within 21 and 25 years, 96 (28.83%) were within 26 and 30 years, 62 (18.62%) were within 31 and 35 years, 39(11.71%) were within 36 and 40 years, 36 (9.61%) were within 41 and 49 years. This implies that the majority of the respondents were within 26 and 30 years.

Table 1 shows the sex distribution of the respondents 189 (56.76%) were females and 144(43.24%) were males. This indicates that bulk of the respondents were females.

Table 1 shows the distribution of the respondents by marital status 102 (30.63%) were singles while 231(69.37%) were married. This implies that the majority of the respondents were married.

Table 1 shows the occupation, 56 (16.82%) were security personnel, 72(21.62%) were civil servants, 71 (21.32%) were students, 109(32.73%) were Business owners, 25 (7.51%) were farmers. This implies that the majority of the respondents were business owners.

Table 2: The Role of Nigerian Police in Curtaining Criminalities in rural communities of Borno State n=333

S/N	Statement	SA	A	UD	D	SD
6	Police force interpret law and maintain order	147(44.14%)	70(21.02%)	21(6.30%)	10(3.00%)	85(25.53%)
7	Police force protect lives and properties	52(.15.62%)	116(34.84%)	30(9.02%)	35(10.51%)	100(30.03%)
8	Police force apprehend and detain criminals	12(3.60%)	131(3933%)	21(9.55%)	72(21.62%)	97(29.13%)
9	Police force keep order in the public	80(24.02%)	154(46.25%)	24(7.21%)	32(9.60%)	43(12.91%)

Source: Field Survey, 2025

Table 2 shows the Role of Nigerian Police in Curtaining Criminalities in rural communities of Borno State. The first table 2 above shows 147(44.14%)respondents strongly agreed that Police force interpret law and maintain order, 70(21.02%) agreed, 21(6.30%) were undecided, however 10(3.00%) strongly disagreed 80(25.53%) disagreed, This implies that police force interpret law and maintain order.

The result of the table 2 above indicates that 12(5.45%) strongly agreed that Police force protect lives and properties, 52(.15.62%) agreed, 100(30.03%) are undecided 35(10.51%) strongly disagreed, 116(52.73%) disagreed. This means that police force protect lives and properties.

In the same table 2 shows the 12(3.60%) strongly agreed that Police force apprehend and detain criminals 131(39.33) agreed, while 21(9.55%) were undecided 72(21.62%) strongly disagreed, 97(29.13%) disagreed. This implies that Police force apprehend and detain criminals.

The result of the table 2 above indicates that 80(24.02%) strongly agreed that Police force keep order in the public. 154(46.25%) agreed, 24(7.21%) undecided, 32(9.60%) strongly disagreed, 43(12.91%) disagreed. This means that police force keep order in the public.

Table 3: Causes of Corruption in Nigerian Police in rural communities of Borno State n=333

S/n	Statement	SA	A	UD	D	SD
10	low wages and affiliation with criminal networks engage police officers can exacerbate bribery and extortion	74 (22.22%)	128 (38.43%)	9 (2.70%)	45 (13.51%)	77 (23.12%)
11	if a police force fails to promote adequate pay, career development, and professionalism, then systemic corruption can occur	121 (36.34%)	82 (24.63%)	6 (1.80%)	24 (7.21%)	100 (30.03%)
12	police officers are not punished for corruption, corrupt activity increases and becomes embedded within a police force	138 (58.18%)	94 (28.23%)	12 (3.60%)	48 (14.41%)	41 (12.31%)
13	lack of institutional accountability	144 (43.24%)	87 (26.13%)	3 (0.90%)	41(12.13 %)	58 (17.42%)

Source: Field Survey, 2025

Table 3 indicates that causes of Corruption in Nigerian Police in rural communities of Borno State where 74(22.22%) strongly agreed that low wages and affiliation with criminal networks engage police officers can exacerbate bribery and extortion 128(38.43%) agreed, while 9(2.70%) are undecided 77(23.12%) agreed, 45(13.51%) strongly disagree. This means that low wages and affiliation with criminal networks engage police officers can exacerbate bribery and extortion.

The result in the above table 3 shows that 121(36.34%) strongly agreed, 82(24.63%) agreed, while 6(1.80%) were undecided, 100(30.03%) disagreed, 24(7.21%) strongly disagreed. This shows that if a police force fails to promote adequate pay, career development, and professionalism, then systemic corruption can occur.

The result in table 3 reveal that 18(8.18%) strongly agreed, 44(20%) agree, 18(8.18%) disagree, 128(58.18%) disagree while 12(5.46%) are undecided. This means that police officers are not punished for corruption, corrupt activity increases and becomes embedded within a police force.

The result of table 3 indicates that 57(25.91%) strongly agreed that lack of institutional accountability 87(26.13%) agreed, while 3(0.90%) were undecided. 41(12.13%) strongly disagreed, 95(43.18%) disagreed, this reveals that lack of institutional accountability.

Table 4: Effects of Corruption in Nigerian Police in rural communities of Borno State n=333

	Statement	SA	A	UD	D	SD
14	Corruption in police force hinders the state and threatens the rule of law	98(29.43%)	135(40.54%)	12(3.60%)	15(4.51%)	73(51.95%)
15	corruption in police force permeates governmental and law enforcement functions that place citizens at an increased risk of poverty	94(28.23%)	119(35.74%)	19(5.71%)	39(11.71%)	62(18.62%)
16	Corruption in police force increases crime	71(21.32%)	127(38.15%)	27(8.11%)	42(12.61%)	66(19.82%)
17	Corruption in police force Increase insecurity	83(24.93%)	123(36.94%)	28(8.42%)	44(12.21%)	55(16.52%)

Source: Field Survey, 2025

Table 4 reveals the effects of Corruption in Nigerian Police in in rural communities of Borno State. The Table 4 shows that 98(29.43%) strongly agreed that Corruption in police force hinders the state and threatens the rule of laws, while 12(3.60%) were undecided, 15(4.51%) strongly disagreed, 135(40.54%) agreed, 73(51.95%) disagreed. This means that corruption in police force hinders the state and threatens the rule of law.

The result of Table 4 above reveals that 94(28.23%) strongly agreed that corruption in police force permeates governmental and law enforcement functions that place citizens at an increased risk of poverty 119(35.74%) agreed, while 19(5.71%) were undecided, 39(11.71%) strongly disagreed, and 62(18.62%) disagreed. This implies that corruption in police force permeates governmental and law enforcement functions that place citizens at an increased risk of poverty.

The same Table 4 indicates that 71(21.32%) strongly agreed corruption in police force increases crime, 127(57.72%) agreed, 27(8.11%) were undecided, 42(12.61%) strongly disagreed, and 66(19.82%) disagreed. This indicates that corruption in police force increases crime.

The result of the table item 4 further indicates that 83(24.93%) strongly agreed, 123(36.94%) agreed, 28(8.42%) were undecided, 44(12.21%) strongly disagreed, 55(16.52%) disagreed. This reveals that corruption in police force Increase insecurity.

Table 5: Possible ways to Curb Corruption in Nigerian Police in rural communities of Borno State n=333

S/N	Statement	SA	A	UD	D	SD
6	Implementation of police commissions of inquiry and strengthening accountability	147(44.14%)	70(21.02%)	21(6.30%)	10(3.00%)	85(25.53%)
7	Establishment of meritocratic appointments and pay reform as part of public administration and civil service reforms	52(.15.62%)	116(34.84%)	30(9.02%)	35(10.51%)	100(30.03%)
8	Implementation of police anticorruption commissions	12(3.60%)	131(3933%)	21(9.55%)	72(21.62%)	97(29.13%)
9	Implementing rotating police officers on a periodical basis	80(24.02%)	154(46.25%)	24(7.21%)	32(9.60%)	43(12.91%)

Source: Field Survey, 2025

Table 5 shows the possible ways to Curb Corruption in Nigerian Police in in rural communities of Borno State The first table 5 above shows 147(44.14%) respondents strongly agreed that implementation of police commissions of inquiry and strengthening accountability, 70(21.02%) agreed, 21(6.30%) were undecided, however 10(3.00%) strongly disagreed 80(25.53%) disagreed, This implies that implementation of police commissions of inquiry and strengthening accountability.

The result of the table 5 above indicates that 12(5.45%) strongly agreed that Establishment of meritocratic appointments and pay reform as part of public administration and civil service reforms, 52(.15.62%) agreed, 100(30.03%) are undecided 35(10.51%) strongly disagreed, 116(52.73%) disagreed. This means that Establishment of meritocratic appointments and pay reform as part of public administration and civil service reforms.

In the same table 5 shows the 12(3.60%) strongly agreed that Implementation of police anticorruption commissions 131(39.33) agreed, while 21(9.55%) were undecided 72(21.62%) strongly disagreed, 97(29.13%)

disagreed. This implies that implementation of police anticorruption commissions.

The result of the table 5 above indicates that 80(24.02%) strongly agreed that Implementing rotating police officers on a periodical basis. 154(46.25%) agreed, 24(7.21%) undecided, 32(9.60%) strongly disagreed, 43(12.91%) disagreed. This means that Implementing rotating police officers on a periodical basis.

Discussion of Findings

The findings on the Role of Nigerian Police in Curtaining Criminalities in rural communities of Borno State revealed that in Police force interpret law and maintain order, protect lives and properties, apprehend and detain criminals as well as keep order in the public

The findings on the Causes of Corruption in Nigerian Police in rural communities of Borno State. Low wages and affiliation with criminal networks engage police officers can exacerbate bribery and extortion, if a police force fails to promote adequate pay, career development, and professionalism, then systemic corruption can occur, police officers are not punished for corruption, corrupt activity increases and becomes embedded within a police force as well as lack of institutional accountability. This is contrary to the study by Abuchi (2013), who reported that the Criminal Justice System in Nigeria is not flexible, tolerant, and liberal like that of developed nations of the world. The standard practice globally is that persons indicted for trivial offences like violating traffic rules, fighting, among other minor crimes are asked to pay fine, participate in community service or pay back what they have wrongfully collected from others. In Nigeria, the reverse is the case, as the prisons in Nigeria are filled with inmates, who have been convicted of minor offences. This has significantly contributed to the problem of prison congestion in Nigeria.

The findings on the effects of Corruption in Nigerian Police in in rural communities of Borno State revealed that Corruption in police force hinders the state and threatens the rule of law. Permeates governmental and law enforcement functions that place citizens at an increased risk of poverty, increases crime as well as Increase insecurity. This in line with findings of Garba, (2019) Criminal Justice system is no longer reliable for securing of life and properties as such the relationship is not cordial and the relationship between Criminal Justice System and the public is amicable in terms of discharging their duties.

The findings on possible ways to Curb Corruption in Nigerian Police in rural communities of Borno State revealed that Implementation of police commissions of inquiry and strengthening accountability, establishment of meritocratic appointments and pay reform as part of public administration and civil service reforms, implementation of police anticorruption commissions as well as implementing rotating police officers on a periodical basis. The findings is in agreement with Marshall (2002) who observed that the exploding prison population is leading to the decay of communities that will have given up an entire generation of young men to prison is factor affecting Criminal Justice System. Furthermore, it is leading to a widely-held belief among black and Hispanic Americans that the criminal justice system is deserving neither of trust nor support. Unfortunately, many politicians and policy makers have the perception that lawlessness is a “colored” problem, and that the disproportionate treatment of blacks and Hispanics within the criminal justice system is a rational response to a statistical imperative. This implies discrimination is a factors responsible for the failure of Criminal Justices system. This discrimination varies by country, e.g. in Nigeria minority tribes are subjected to severe justice without mercy compared to the dominant tribes in Nigeria.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The study concluded that police in Criminal Justice System in rural communities of Borno State are facing challenges of protection of lives of the general public and properties from the activities of criminals and Boko Haram insurgency. This has help greatly in formulating policy that is directed toward an effective crime control mechanism and solving the problems of crime control which also has been of social concern to many societies today which are common in most localities of Borno State. Thus any attempt to control crime without proper understanding of the militating problems will not produce any meaningful result. Hence policy makers should first addressed the problems of crime control before any attempt or effort toward the control of crime.

Based on the results, the study recommended that Federal government should provide logistics to the police performance in criminal justice system in order to encourage accountability in discharging their duties.

Federal government should create a tribunal to checkmate the activities of police in Criminal Justice system in order to promote fairness.

Government, individual and group or organisations to help equip the crime control group so that they can face the enemy out there. By closer looking at both informal and formal crime control agencies one can find out that they are poorly equipped in terms of operational tools.

Legislature should enact laws against inequality in police criminal justice system and the general public should be enlighten on such law.

Politician or the authority should not interfere in the duties of police in criminal justice system.

REFERENCES

Achakzai, A. (2010). Corruption and Its Effects on Public Trust and State-Building. Kabul: Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies.

Amundsen, I. (2000). Political Science Perspectives on Corruption. In Research on Corruption: A Policy Orientated Survey. Edited by Jens Chr. Andvig, Odd-helge Fjeldstad, Inge Amundsen and Tina Søreide. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute and Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, pp. 51–62.

Anassi, P. (2004). Corruption in Africa: The Kenyan Experience. Victoria: Trafford.

Askari, H., Scheherazade S. R. and Noora, A. (2010). Corruption and its Manifestation in the Persian Gulf. Cheltenham and Glos: Edward Elgar.

Azami, S. (2009). The Need for Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan to Curb Corruption. Peace & Conflict Monitor. November 4.

Banks, C. (2009). Criminal Justice Ethics: Theory and Practice, 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Barker, T. (2006). Police Ethics: Crisis in Law Enforcement, 2nd ed. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas.

Bayley, D. and Robert M. P. (2011). Police Corruption: What Past Scandals Teach about Current Challenges. USIP Special Report 294. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

Beittel, J. S. (2011). Mexico's Drug Trafficking Organisations: Source and Scope of the Rising Violence. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.

Bolle, T. A. and Espen R. (2021). Donors Spent $100 Billion Building an Afghan Police Force. When the Taliban Captured Kabul, It "Disappeared" Overnight. Bistands Aktuelt. September 13.

Buckman, R. T. (2007). Latin America 2007. Ranson: Stryker-Post Publications.

Burgan, M. (2013). Voting and Elections. London: Raintree Publishers.

Buscaglia, E. and Samuel G. (2006). The Factor of Trust and the Importance of Inter-agency Co-operation in the Fight Against Transnational Organised Crime: The US-Mexican Example. In Borders and Security Governance: Managing Borders in a Globalised World. Edited by Marina Caparini and Otwin Marenin. Zürich: LIT Verlag/DCAF, pp. 291–302.

Buxton, J. (2006). The Political Economy of Narcotics: Production, Consumption, and Global Markets. New York: St Martin's Press.

Carter, D. L. (1990). Drug-related Corruption of Police Officers: A Contemporary Typology. Journal of Criminal Justice 18: 85–98.

Chandler, D. (2010). International Statebuilding: The Rise of Post-Liberal Governance. Oxon: Routledge.

Clark, W. A. (1993). Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom: Combating Corruption in the Political Elite, 1965–1990. New York: M.E. Sharpe.

Dibua, J. I. (2006). Modernisation and the Crisis of Development in Africa: The Nigerian Experience. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Dowell-Jones, M. (2004). Contextualising the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Assessing the Economic Deficit. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Dziedzic, M. J. and Leonard R. H. (2005). Introduction. In The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation. Edited by Jock Covey, Michael J. Dziedzic and Leonard R. Hawley. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, pp. 3–22.

Eichenwald, K. (2012). 500 Days: Secrets and Lies in the Terror Wars. New York: Touchstone.

Eke, A. (2018). Kleptocracy: African Style. Pittsburgh: Dorrance Publishing Co.

Ettang, D., and Nthatuwa L. (2019). Africa's Emerging Giants and the Drug Scourge: Exploring a Nigeria-South African Bilateral Partnership. In Nigeria-South African Relations and Regional Hegemonic Competence. Edited by Oluwaseun Tella. Cham: Springer, pp. 129–45.

Gaines, L. K., nd Victor E. K. (2015). Policing in America, 8th ed. Waltham: Elsevier.

Gerber, T. P., and Mendelson, S. (2008). Public Experiences of Police Violence and Corruption in Contemporary Russia: A Case of Predatory Policing? Law & Society Review 42: 1–44.

Gong, T. and Alfred M. W. (2012). Does Increased Civil Service Pay Deter Corruption? Evidence from China. Review of Public Personnel Administration 32: 192–204.

Gottschalk, P. (2009). Knowledge Management in Police Oversight: Law Enforcement Integrity and Accountability. Boca Raton: Brown Walker Press.

Heidenheimer, A. J. and Michael J. (2002). Introduction. In Political Corruption: Concepts & Contexts, 3rd ed. Edited by Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, pp. 3–14.

Hobson, C. (1996). The Great Chief Justice John Marshall and the Rule of Law. Kansas: University Press of Kansas.

Holmes, L. (2022). Comparing Police Corruption: Bulgaria, Germany, Russia and Singapore. Oxon: Routledge.

Horvitz, L., A., and Christopher C. (2006). Encyclopedia of War Crimes and Genocide. New York: Facts on File.

Huberts, L. W. J. C. (1998). Blind Sports in Police Practice and Police Science. Deventer: Gouda Quint.

Huberts, L. W. J. C., Jeroen Maesschalck, and Carole L. Jurkiewicz, eds. (2008). Global Perspectives on Good Governance Policies and Research. In Ethics and Integrity of Governance: Perspectives across Frontiers. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 239–64.

Human Rights Watch. (2010.) Afghanistan: Repeal Amnesty Law. Human Rights Watch. March 10.

Ihonvbere, J. O. (2003). Dismantling a Discredited One-Party Regime: Populism and Political Liberalisation in Zambia. In Political Liberalisation and Democratisation in Africa: Lessons from Country Experiences. Edited by Julius O. Ihonvbere and John Mukum Mbaku. Westport: Praeger Publishers, pp. 51–84.

Integrity Watch Afghanistan. (2010). Afghan Perceptions and Experiences of Corruption: A National Survey. Kabul: Integrity Watch Afghanistan.

Isaqzadeh, M. R. and Antonion G. (2015). Senior Appointments and Corruption within the Afghan MoI: Practices and Perceptions. Kabul: IWA.

Ivković, Sanja Kutnjak. 2005. Fallen Blue Knights: Controlling Police Corruption. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ivković, S. K. (2014). Police Misconduct. In The Oxford Handbook of Police and Policing. Edited by Michael D. Reisig and Robert J. Kane. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 302–37.

Stevens, D.J. (2009). An Introduction to American Policing. Sudbury: Jones and Bartlett Publishers.

Stinson, P., Sr., John L., Michael B., and Steven L. B. Jr. (2018). To Protect and Collect: A Nationwide Study of Profit-motivated Police Crime. Criminal Justice Studies 31: 310–31.

Toma, R. M. (2009). Dysfunctional Social Capital in Post-Communist States: Analysing Correlates of Perceived Corruption in the Romanian Civil Service. Ann Arbor: ProQuest.

Transparency for Colombia. (2009). Report from Colombian Organisations of the Civil Society for Presentation to the Third Round of the Committee of Experts of the Follow-up Mechanism for the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption. August.

Transparency International. (2021). What Is Corruption? United Nations Development Programme. (2009). Police Perception Survey 2009: The Afghan Perspective. Wilder, A.. (2007). Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.

Windsor, J.. (2006). Prepared Statement of Ms. Jennifer Windsor, Executive Director, Freedom House. In Transparency and Rule of Law in Latin America. Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress First Session, 25 May 2005. Edited by Henry J. Hyde. Washington: US Government Printing Office, pp. 58–62.

Wood, J. R. T. (1997). Final Report of the Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service: Volume 1: Corruption. Commissioner, The Hon Justice JRT Wood. Sydney: Government of the State of New South Wales.

World Bank. (2000a). Anticorruption in Transition: A Contribution to the Policy Debate. Washington, DC: World Bank.

World Bank. (2000b). Helping Countries Combat Corruption: Progress at the World Bank Since 1997. Operational Core Services and Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network. Washington, DC: World Bank.

World Bank. 2005. Afghanistan–State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing Poverty. Washington, DC: World Bank.