ADMINISTRATIVE CAPTURE AND POLICY FAILURE IN NIGERIAS PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS: RETHINKING REGULATORY INDEPENDENCE IN EMERGING DEMOCRACIES (2020–2026)
Onamah Ojodomo Godwin, PhD and Joel Akowe, PhD
Volume 14 Issue 1
Abstract
This study examines the causal relationship between administrative capture and policy failure in Nigerias public institutions between 2020 and 2026. Despite multiple governance reforms, Nigeria continues to experience widespread policy inconsistency, weak implementation, bureaucratic inefficiency, and regulatory dysfunction across major sectors. Drawing on regulatory capture theory, principal-agent theory, institutional theory, public choice theory, and digital-era governance theory, the study finds that many Nigerian regulatory institutions suffer from weak operational autonomy, politicised appointments, budgetary dependence, selective enforcement, and inadequate technical capacity. These conditions create opportunities for administrative capture, corruption, and policy manipulation. Policy failure in Nigeria reflects not poor technical planning but deeper structural problems: neopatrimonialism, weak rule of law, and fragile democratic institutions. Digital governance reforms, including the Treasury Single Account, Integrated Payroll and Personnel Information System, and electronic procurement, offer opportunities to reduce administrative discretion but face persistent resistance from entrenched interests. The study concludes that sustainable regulatory independence requires institutional autonomy, legal protection, professional bureaucracy, judicial independence, digital transparency, and civic participation. Recommendations include strengthening institutional autonomy, professionalising public administration, expanding digital governance, and strengthening judicial independence. Keywords: Administrative Capture; Policy Failure; Regulatory Independence; Public Institutions; Neopatrimonialism
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